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PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
EXAMPLE LESSONS
EDWARD P. RICHARDS*
The greatest change in legal practice over the past fifty years has been the
shift from primarily private law between private parties, to public law. Public law
can include the regulation of private parties, litigants (both governmental and
private) challenging government policy, or the operation of agencies themselves.
The jurisprudential core of public law is administrative law, which describes the
relationship between the courts, government agencies, and regulated parties.
Government agencies were as critical to the civil rights revolution as they have
been to environmental law and, for better and worse, the development of the
modem health care system. It is ironic that few law schools require all students to
take a course in administrative law, and that at many schools a student may
graduate with few or no public law courses on his or her transcript.
Public health law was the first administrative law. The colonies were ravaged
by communicable diseases such as cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox. Early state
governments carried out Draconian measures to control these diseases. The early
and middle 1800s saw extensive state regulation of all aspects of life, including the
core areas of public health and safety.1 Regulation of food and water, sanitation,
and housing conditions, combined with communicable disease control measures
such as mandatory vaccination laws and isolation of communicable disease
carriers, raised the life expectancy in cities such as Boston by more than fifty years
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1. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (reviewing state regulations in public health and safety, as well as general
economic regulation in the nineteenth century).
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
between 1850 and 2004.2 Modem environmental law, the heart of many
administrative law texts, is an extension of traditional public health law.
For the past twenty-five years, public health law, as taught in law schools, has
mostly focused on a very narrow part of public health practice: individual liberties
issues in health care, usually focusing on the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Students who
take these courses see only a small part of public health practice, missing the close
linkage between public health law and environmental law on federal and state
levels, and missing almost all of the state and local government law that shapes
most public health practice. The students see public health law as individual
liberties law, with the primary example being laws enacted to prevent public health
authorities from identifying and tracking cases of HIV infection and taking disease
control measures to limit the spread of HIV.3 They learn little, if anything, of the
public health consequences of these policies, such as fostering the spread of HIV in
the female partners of HIV infected men, especially in minority communities.
4
More fundamentally, students in these courses come to see public health
departments as social welfare agencies that should be concerned with delivering
social services and that should not interfere with individual freedom. This does not
provide a comprehensive model of public health law that can also address issues
such as obesity, smoking in private, and the economic rights that must be balanced
in many environmental regulations.
Public health law taught as administrative law embeds public health law in a
broad and well-understood jurisprudential framework. This gives students a much
broader view of public health law jurisprudence, and enables better understanding
of the full spectrum of public health law and public health law practice. For
students taking administrative law courses, public health law provides problems
that are easier to understand and that are more compelling than the Interstate
Commerce Commission and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission cases that are
2. The Shattuck Report found that the average age of death in Boston between 1840 and 1845 was
21.43 years. LEMUEL SHATTUCK ET AL., REPORT OF THE SANITARY COMMISSION OF MASSACHUSETTS
1850, at 104 (Harvard Univ. Press 1948) (1850). Federal health statistics show that life expectancy in
2004 was 77.8 years. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006 WITH
CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMS. 176 (2006), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus.htm.
3. STEPHEN C. JOSEPH, DRAGON WITHIN THE GATES: THE ONCE AND FUTURE AIDS EPIDEMIC
101 (1992) ("The initial public policy responses to the epidemic were designed as if the most important
criterion was to protect civil liberties from abuse by public health actions. Thus, rather than searching
for the most powerful disease prevention strategies compatible with the protection of individual rights,
the conventional wisdom in AIDS policy became a watered-down version of the opposite: a civil rights
strategy against which public health actions were to be measured."); see also City of New York v. New
St. Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982-83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding that the high death rate
caused by AIDS attributed to risky sexual behavior in bathhouses demonstrate a "compelling state
interest" to infringe upon individual rights of freedom of association and rights of privacy).
4. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC HIV/AIDS FACT SHEET: HIV/AIDS
AMONG WOMEN 3-4 (2006), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/women/resources/factsheets/pdf/women.pdf
(providing statistical evidence on higher rates of AIDS among minority females).
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the bane of many administrative law students. Public health law is administrative
law on a more human scale and introduces students to the world of state and local
administrative law.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINAL INTENT
From colonial times through the mid-1800s, states were wracked with
communicable diseases. In our modem world, we lose track of the primal fear of
plagues, so it is important to remind students about the power of these fears and the
threat that communicable diseases posed to society throughout history.5 This
background helps students understand why courts granted broad powers to
legislatures and public health agencies, as well as why public health and national
security laws have common roots.
Most of the colonial cities were built on waterways or along coastlines
because trade traveled by water. These coastal areas were surrounded by marshes
and wetlands, subjecting the colonies to mosquito-borne illnesses-yellow fever
and malaria-as well as water-borne illnesses-typhoid and cholera-driven by
poor drinking water sanitation.6 Smallpox made regular appearances in colonial
cities, as did other epidemic diseases, and tuberculosis (consumption) was a
constant companion.' The classic book, Rats, Lice and History, provides a graphic
view of this world:
In earlier ages, pestilences were mysterious visitations, expressions of
the wrath of higher powers which came out of a dark nowhere, pitiless,
dreadful, and inescapable. In their terror and ignorance, men did the
very things which increased death rates and aggravated calamity ....
Panic bred social and moral disorganization; farms were abandoned, and
there was shortage of food; famine led to . . . civil war, and, in some
instances, to fanatical religious movements which contributed to
profound spiritual and political transformations.
8
The first demographic study of disease, The Shattuck Report, was done in
Massachusetts in the late 1840s.9 This study showed that the life expectancy in
5. Hysterical overreactions to the anthrax letters mailed after 9/1l, as well as more recent concerns
regarding bird flu, were both driven by this same primal fear. See Barry DeCoster, Avian Influenza and
the Failure of Public Rationing Discussions, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 620, 620 (2006) ("Over the last
year, the public has focused its anxious attention on the possible avian influenza pandemic."); Barry
Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 417, 419 (2001) ("Biological terrorism is truly a despicable subject, raising nightmares of primal
fear.").
6. See Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus Raich, Health Care and the Commerce Clause, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 957, 983 (2005) (noting that epidemics such as smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, and
malaria swept the east coast during the early nineteenth century).
7. See id. at 983.
8. HANS ZINSSER, RATS, LICE AND HISTORY 129 (spec. ed., Classics of Med. Library 1997)
(1935).
9. SHATTUCK ET AL., supra note 2.
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Boston was approximately 21.5 years, having declined as the city grew more
crowded.1 ° Section II of the study, "The Sanitary Movement at Home," provides a
detailed and horrifying view of communicable diseases in the colonies. 1
Additionally, Plagues and Peoples, a history of the political impact of
communicable diseases on social order, provides a better understanding of real and
perceived threats posed by communicable diseases to states, which was why such
diseases were seen as threats to national security as well as health.
12
Disease threats were the genesis of traditional public health law-abatement
of nuisances, quarantine for communicable diseases, regulation of the sale of food
and drink-and were key functions of government in the colonial period. Cities
such as Boston and New York have regulated public health matters for longer than
they have been part of the United States. 13 Both before and after the ratification of
the Constitution, cities took draconian actions to stem outbreaks of disease,
especially yellow fever, which killed ten percent of the population of Philadelphia
in one summer and fall. 14 Smith v. Turner discusses the funding of the marine
quarantine hospitals and pays particular attention to counsel's argument describing
the 1798 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia.' 5 This case demonstrates that
public health measures were well known to the drafters of the Constitution. When
the drafters reserved the police powers to the states, public health actions were one
of the most important powers the drafters had in mind.'6 The courts accepted such
powers because epidemic diseases were as great a threat to the state as war.
Ironically, while there is little in constitutional history to Support an original intent
basis for administrative law, this historical background provides a powerful original
intent argument for strong public health laws.
10. Id. at 104 (noting that the life expectancy of a person living in Boston was 27.85 years between
1810 to 1820, and that it declined to 21.43 years between 1840 and 1845); Edward L. Glaeser,
Reinventing Boston: 1640-2003, at 13, 47 fig.1 (Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No.
2017, 2003) (illustrating that these changes in life expectancy took place during a time period in Boston
during which the city became more populous).
11. Id. at 48-106.
12. WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES (Anchor Books, Doubleday 1998).
13. ESTHER FORBES, PAUL REVERE & THE WORLD HE LIVED IN 76-78 (Sentry ed., Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1969) (describing the role of "Selectmen" that the Boston community elected to regulate the
outbreak of smallpox in 1764). Paul Revere served on the Boston Board of Health. City of Boston,
Boston Public Health Commission (2007), http://www.ci.boston.ma.us/publichealth/ (last visited Mar.
17, 2007).
14. J.H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD: THE GREAT PLAGUE OF YELLOW FEVER IN
PHILADELPHIA IN 1793, at vi, 242-47, 282 (1949) (explaining that in 1783, 5,000 of Philadelphia's
55,000 inhabitants died of yellow fever). This compelled the Assistant Committee to take draconian
measures to mount "resistance to disaster." Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 341 (1849).
15. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 299-300 (arguing that yellow fever outbreaks in-cities such as Philadelphia
and New York served as the impetus to the enactment of quarantine laws).
16. Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense
Against Dangerous Persons, 16 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 329, 334 (1989); see NOVAK, supra note 1, at 194
("[P]ublic health was at the center of a legal and political revolution that culminated in the creation of
modem constitutional law and a positive administrative state.").
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II. COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS ON STATE POLICE POWER
Since public health powers are part of the core of powers left to states by the
Constitution, public health cases are a key part of modem Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. By reading public health cases, students can better understand the
tension between a state's right to regulate and the federal preemption of that right
by a specific statute or through the Dormant Commerce Clause. These are not
administrative law cases in the classic sense, in that they are usually taught in
constitutional law rather than administrative law, but they are critical to
understanding the state and local administrative law that underlies public health
practice. The doctrines that emerge from these cases are not yet settled; however, as
new controversies-municipal regulation of trans fats to improve the public's
health, for example-they raise powerful Dormant Commerce Clause issues.
17
Gibbons v. Ogden involved a conflict between the federal regulation of
steamships on navigable waterways and New York laws regulating steamships.18
The New York laws concerned both commerce and public health and safety
because, among other reasons, the boilers of steam engines during that period were
prone to explode. 19 This case was well argued and the arguments are published with
the opinion, including an argument by Daniel Webster.20 The United States
Supreme Court analyzed the conflict between the powers reserved to the states and
the Congressional powers implicit in the Commerce Clause, and in the process
brought Commerce Clause jurisprudence into existence. 21 For public health
students, Gibbons has much to say about state versus federal powers that is still
relevant to disputes such as whether states can regulate greenhouse gases to protect
citizens from global warming.
Smith v. Turner, cited earlier for its descriptive history of yellow fever in the
United States, concerned a New York State tax on passengers arriving in the United
States. 22 The state collected the tax to pay for the public health services that the
17. See Jonathan S. Goldman, Take That Tobacco Settlement and Super-Size It!: The Deep-Frying
of the Fast Food Industry?, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 113, 129 n. 113 (2003) (arguing that the
federal government has the ability to regulate fast food chains pursuant to the Commerce Clause, while
federal law, through the Food and Drug Administration, preempts states and local municipalities from
passing legislation relating to the content and safety of food). N.Y. City Dep't of Health & Mental
Hygiene, Bd. of Health, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment (§81.08) to Article 81 of the New York
City Health Code (2006), http://www.nyc.govlhtml/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art8I-
08.pdf.
18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1-2 (1824).
19. Joseph C. Sweeney, Limitation of Shipowner Liability: Its American Roots and Some Problems
Particular to Collision, 32 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 241, 247 (2001) ("The age of the steamboat was also the
age of spectacular explosions of steam boilers causing many deaths, injuries and substantial cargo
damage.").
20. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 3-33.
21. Id. at 186-222 (establishing that Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate commerce on
navigable waters).
22. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 298-300 (1849).
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state provided to the ports.23 The Court had a detailed discussion regarding the use
of the state's police powers to protect the public health.24 However, Congress had
also legislated in this area, establishing quarantine hospitals, a rare example of early
direct federal public health efforts.25 Turner looked at the conflict between the
state's exercise of its public health powers and federal government's power to deal
with international trade and travel. While the Court recognized the preeminence of
state law in quarantine and communicable disease control, it found that the federal
government's right to regulate international commerce trumped the state's power to
tax foreign travelers, even if this tax supported public health measures.26
In Railroad Co. v. Husen, the Court considered a Missouri statute that was
intended to prevent the spread of disease by cattle transported through the state.27
The state argued that the statute was a proper exercise of its police power because it
had an exception that allowed the transportation of cattle through the state if they
were not unloaded.28 The plaintiffs argued that the law was overbroad because it
created a presumption that if any diseased cattle were found along the
transportation route, the shipping companies were responsible if they had shipped
any cattle.29 Plaintiffs claimed that this effectively banned the shipping of all cattle
through Missouri from March through October, and thus it violated the Interstate
Commerce Clause. 30 The Court held that while the state had broad powers to
impose quarantines and regulate dangerous goods, if such laws interfered with
interstate commerce, they had to be narrowly tailored to limit their effects on
commerce. 3 1 In Husen, the Court cited many pertinent cases that upheld state
transportation regulations in other contexts. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
for example, the Court relied on the same principles as those noted in Husen to
invalidate a New Jersey law that prevented other states from shipping solid or
liquid waste to disposal sites in New Jersey.
32
The milk cases addressed the fascinating regulatory tension between
legitimate sanitary regulations and discriminatory trade regulations passed under
the guise of public health and safety. Milk is a staple of the American diet but, at
the same time, it poses difficult food sanitation issues. Milk spoils easily; it
transmits common cattle diseases such as brucellosis and tuberculosis to people;
and it is easily contaminated with bacteria that cause human disease, such as
23. Id. at 403.
24. Id. at 329-36.
25. Id. at 424-25.
26. Id. at 414-17.
27. 95 U.S. 465,468-69 (1877).
28. See id. at 469.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 466-67.
31. Id. at 472-73.
32. 437 U.S. 617, 621-24 (1978).
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listeriosis. 33 Nevertheless, milk is an important local farm commodity. 34 In Miller v.
Williams, an early Dormant Commerce Clause case, a Maryland court considered a
Baltimore public health regulation that banned cream produced more than fifty
miles from the city from being used in ice cream produced in Baltimore.35 The
court found that while the City had the right to regulate the use of cream, it had to
do so in a manner that did not discriminate against suppliers of cream from
localities outside Baltimore.36 A pair of state supreme court cases eventually
explored the proper scope of state milk regulations: James v. Todd upheld an
Alabama regulation,37 while Otto Milk Co. v. Rose struck down a Pittsburgh
regulation. 38 Public health law students should compare and contrast these cases to
determine if there is an acceptable standard for this type of regulation. More
recently, similar issues have arisen as states confront cases involving contaminated
foods, such as fresh spinach.39
In Massachusetts v. Hayes, the court examined the issue of direct federal
preemption of state health and safety regulations through a Commerce Clause-
based law. 40 The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) gave the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) authority to regulate medical devices.4' The MDA
provided that states could not pass laws that imposed different or conflicting
standards on FDA-regulated devices.42 Hayes involved a challenge to a
Massachusetts consumer protection law regulating the sale and fitting of hearing
aids and providing for more stringent medical examination guidelines than the FDA
regulations required.43 The court found that the state's regulation was preempted by
the FDA regulation." Hayes emerged as a key precedent for the battle between the
states and Congress over the right to control the regulation of tobacco.
The Tobacco Labeling Act cases are of two types: cases prohibiting tort law
claims that conflict with the Tobacco Labeling Act, and cases prohibiting state and
33. Linda Bren, Got Milk? Make Sure It's Pasteurized, 38 FDA CONSUMER 29, 30 (2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/504-milk.html.
34. Econ. Research Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Dairy, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Dairy (last
visited Oct. 14, 2006) ("Milk has a farm value of production second only to beef among livestock
industries and equal to com.").
35. 12 F. Supp. 236, 237 (D. Md. 1935).
36. Id. at 244.
37. 103 So. 2d 19, 27 (Ala. 1957).
38. 99 A.2d 467, 472-73 (Pa. 1953).
39. See, e.g., Stacy Finz & Erin Allday, Spinach Growers Were Warned About Produce Safety:
State, Federal Officials Concerned by 20 Reports of Tainted Greens, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19, 2006, at A-
1; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Ongoing Multistate Outbreak of Escherichia coli Serotype
0157:H7 Infections Associated with Consumption of Fresh Spinach - United States, September 2006,
55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1-2 (2006).
40. 691 F.2d 57, 59 (lstCir. 1982).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 64.
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local regulations regarding the advertising of tobacco. Tobacco use is the most
important preventable public health problem in the United States. Until recently,
tobacco was considered an important domestic crop and international export and,
accordingly, there was little regulation of tobacco use beyond laws directed at
collecting tobacco taxes. In the mid-1960s, however, Congress passed the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (Act), which, while requiring warning labels on
cigarettes, limited the rights of states to regulate tobacco sales and advertising.45
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. represents the tort preemption line of the Tobacco
Labeling Act cases.46 Cipollone includes an excellent discussion of the legislative
history of the Act and its amendments.47 Cipollone illustrates how the Act, which
ostensibly required tobacco companies to warn smokers about the risks of tobacco,
was actually passed in order to protect tobacco companies. Lorillard Tobacco
Company v. Reilly, represents the line of the Tobacco Labeling Act cases aimed at
limiting state and local regulations regarding the advertising of tobacco.48 In
Lorillard, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts state law limiting
tobacco advertising.49 The Court discussed the tension between federal inaction
regarding tobacco regulation and states' efforts to regulate the sale and use of
tobacco. Echoing the sentiments of Justice Brandeis, tobacco regulation is an
excellent example of the idea that states should be allowed to be laboratories for
social policy innovation. 50
III. EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
A key issue in administrative law is the relationship between courts and
agencies. If courts review all agency decisions de novo, rehearing expert witnesses
and substituting their decisions for those of the agencies, the government loses the
value of agency expertise and flexibility. However, if courts do not review agency
actions, this inaction will undermine the separation of powers. This is a core issue
in administrative law, with the Supreme Court limiting judicial efforts to impose
additional requirements on agency decision-making, 5' upholding significant
deference to agencies for some actions,52 but establishing rules for when such
45. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1965)).
46. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
47. Id. at 513-15.
48. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
49. Id. at 570-71.
50. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
51. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555
(1978) ("[T]he role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an agency's consideration of
environmental factors is a limited one, limited both by the time at which the decision was made and by
the statute mandating review.").
52. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have
long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer ... ").
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deference is limited.53 Determining the proper standard for judicial review in
administrative law is controversial because agency deference prevents opponents of
public actions from being able to contest these actions.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts is a key public health law and administrative law
case, 54 noteworthy for its judicial review jurisprudence and its balancing of
individual versus societal rights, as will be discussed later in this article. In
Jacobson, the Court reviewed a state law giving the health department the power to
require smallpox vaccinations for all adult citizens when the health department
determined that the community was threatened by smallpox.5 The statute provided
a criminal fine for those who refused to be vaccinated." Reverend Jacobson, who
was resisting the vaccination order,57 wished to present evidence of the risks of
vaccination, which were very real at that time. 58 At issue in Jacobson was whether
Reverend Jacobson would be allowed to present evidence opposing the scientific
basis of the mandatory vaccine law and ask the court to review the agency's
balancing of the risk and benefits of mandatory smallpox vaccinations.59 Although
the Court's discussion focused on the legislature's power, this power was actually
delegated to and exercised by the state Board of Health, rather than being a self-
executing statute.60 The Court found that the smallpox vaccination law was a
legitimate policy choice by the legislature and that the defendant could not
collaterally attack the legislative findings or the decision by the health department
that the law should be applied.61 The Jacobson standard was later articulated in
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore:
53. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) ("The fair measure of deference to an
agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have
looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the
persuasiveness of the agency's position.") (citations omitted).
54. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id.
57. Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights Versus the Public's Health - 100 Years After
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652 (2005).
58. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23. The current smallpox vaccine is also dangerous, which was a major
issue debated during the smallpox vaccination campaign in 2003. See Edward P. Richards et al., The
Smallpox Vaccination Campaign of 2003: Why Did It Fail and What Are the Lessons for Bioterrorism
Preparedness?, 64 LA. L. REV. 851, 865-69 (2004).
59. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 23-24.
60. Id. at 27.
The Revised Laws of that Commonwealth, c. 75, § 137, provide that "the board of health of a
city or town if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety shall require and
enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and shall provide
them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and
not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit five
dollars."
Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 30-31.
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It is not the function of a court to determine whether the public policy
that finds expression in legislation of this order is well or ill conceived.
The judicial function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation
between means and end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory
pretence. Within the field where men of reason may reasonably differ,
the legislature must have its way.62
While not a traditional public health case, Williams is frequently cited as the
standard the Supreme Court uses to evaluate agency discretion in public health law
cases.
The fluoridation cases allow the discussion in Jacobson to be extended to
preventive measures for conditions that are much less serious than smallpox. The
addition of small amounts of sodium fluoride to drinking water greatly reduces
tooth decay in children, particularly in areas of the country where water supplies do
not contain sufficient natural fluoride.63 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) identified the fluoridation of water as one of the major
achievements in public health in the twentieth century.64 Yet, fluoridation has been
and continues to be one of the most controversial public health measures.
Approximately fifty-six percent of the population in the United States receives
water with sufficient sodium fluoride to reduce dental caries. 65 This represents a
combination of naturally occurring fluoride and fluoride added during drinking
water treatment. Resistance to fluoridation has both scientific and political roots.
Sodium fluoride is a deadly poison if taken in larger amounts than the traces used
in water treatment processes.66 Even in the amounts found naturally in some
drinking water and in fluoridated drinking water, fluoride may have minor,
deleterious effects on some individuals. 67 Fluoridation became a right wing
political issue during the early part of the Cold War because it was considered a
Communist-inspired plot to weaken Americans.68
Courts have heard a series of cases challenging a state's right to fluoridate
water, which generally proceed on the theory that fluoride has not been proven
62. 289 U.S. 36, 42 (1933) (citations omitted).
63. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-1999:
Fluoridation of Drinking Water to Prevent Dental Caries, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
933, 936 (1999).
64. Id. at 933.
65. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Recommendations for Using Fluoride to Prevent and
Control Dental Caries in the United States, 50 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 10 (2001),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr50l4al.htm.
66. AM. DENTAL Ass'N, FLUORIDATION FACTS 31 (2005), available at
http://www.ada.org/public/topics/fluoride/facts/fluoridationfacts.pdf.
67. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Statement on the 2006 National Research Council
(NRC) Report on Fluoride in Drinking Water, http://www.cdc.gov/fluoridation/safety/nrc report.htm
(last visited Feb. 27, 2007).
68. This is the subject of a rant by General Ripper in Dr. Strangelove, the classic Cold War movie.
DR. STRANGELOVE OR How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Hawk Films Ltd.
1964).
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effective and that, even if it is effective, there is no justification for forcing
individuals opposed to fluoridation to drink fluoridated water to benefit others.69
Simple Internet searches demonstrate that this controversy is still alive and that it
still prevents many poor children from receiving adequate fluoride to prevent tooth
decay. Students may also wish to see if their local drinking water meets
recommended fluoride standards.
While Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. is not
discussed in most public health law courses, it is the most important precedent for
understanding how courts will review all agency decisions, including public health
cases. 70 Chevron involved the regulation of industrial pollution under the Clean Air
Act and a challenge by an environmental group claiming that these regulations
exceeded the governing agency's power.71 The Court developed a two-step analysis
for this and other agency regulations, at least for those promulgated through the
notice and comment process.72 First, the Court determines whether the enabling law
for the agency clearly gives the agency power to regulate in the particular
regulatory area or clearly prohibits the regulation.73 If the regulation is clearly
provided for by Congress, or if it is clearly prohibited, the Court can rule without
going further. If the regulation is consistent with the enabling law, but not clearly
allowed, the Court then determines whether the regulation is a reasonable
implementation of congressional direction.74 Difficult cases, including Chevron, are
those where a statute grants broad power with only a general expression of intent.
In these cases, the Chevron analysis is very deferential to agencies. While this may
allow agencies to weaken regulations in administrations that do not support strong
public health and safety regulations, it is beneficial in the long term because it
leaves agencies free to change directions under each different administration.
Chevron also answers the question of how the Court would rule on traditional
public health law cases, such as Jacobson, if presented to the Court today. Because
Chevron is more deferential than the standards used by the historical courts to
review cases like Jacobson, it is clear that the Court would not overrule such a case
today.
69. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 417 P.2d 632, 635 (Wash. 1966) (rejecting the
argument that fluoridation exceeded the City's police powers since it was furnishing fluoridated water
only to its inhabitants); Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Mich. 1965) (holding that, by
virtue of constitutional, statutory, and charter provisions, the City possessed "adequate authority for
enactment of the [fluoride] ordinance"); Kaul v. City of Chehalis, 277 P.2d 352, 357 (Wash. 1954) (en
banc) (finding that the City's fluoridation efforts were "a valid exercise of the police power and violated
no constitutional rights guaranteed to appellant").
70. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
71. Id. at 840.
72. There is less deference for regulations that do not go through public comment and participation.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001).
73. Chevron, 476 U.S. at 842-43.
74. Id. at 845.
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In City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, the New York City Health
Department sought a permanent injunction to close gay bathhouses.75 This case is a
good vehicle for discussing the failure of public health agencies to confront the
disease threat posed by the bathhouses in the early- and mid-1970s, as well as the
repercussions of that failure when HIV became a virulent threat to the bathhouses
in the late-197,0s.76 This failure has it roots a decade earlier in the failure of the
Swine Flu immunization program. The official report prepared by the United
States Department of Health, Education, and the Workforce (HEW) on the Swine
Flu panic in 1976 provides good background.77 At the CDC's urging, the White
House implemented a nationwide emergency vaccination program for a new strain
of flu, Swine Flu, which public health authorities feared would lead to a national
flu pandemic.78 The vaccination program became a public relations nightmare,
however, when the vaccine was thought to cause a serious neurological disease.79
The resulting scandal discredited public health authorities and undermined political
support for the government taking strong public health actions. 80 The result was
catastrophic, both to the law and to the public's health.
In the aftermath of the Swine Flu disaster, frightening data emerged about an
epidemic of Hepatitis B that was sweeping gay bathhouses. 81 This data illustrated
that almost every gay man who frequented the bathhouses became infected with the
deadly, incurable virus. 82 Rather than closing the bathhouses, as states would have
done in the past, bathhouses were allowed to continue operating, and health
departments were directed to work with them to improve public health education
about the risks of Hepatitis B exposure in bathhouses. Unfortunately, when HIV
began to spread among bathhouse patrons in the late 1970s, it quickly infected most
75. 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 981 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (permanent injunction proceeding), affd, 562
N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
76. For extensive materials on the history and failure of HIV law, see Edward Richards, Testimony
Before the Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS: AIDS Law - Past and Future (June 21, 2005),
http://biotech.law.Isu.edu/cphl/slides/aids-com.htm.
77. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARvEY V. FrNEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING
ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE (1978), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cphl/history/books/sw/index.htm.
78. Id. at 5-9.
79. Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1984); NEUSTADT & F[NEBERG,
supra note 77, at 97-98.
80. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 77, at 2-3.
81. See James R. Thompson, Understanding the AIDS Epidemic: A Modeler's Odyssey, in APPLIED
MATHEMATICAL MODELING: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 41, 55 (D.R. Shier & K.T. Wallenius
eds., 1999); see also Herbert W. Hethcote & James A. Yorke, Gonorrhea Transmission Dynamics and
Control, in 56 LECTURE NOTES IN BIOMATHEMATICS (S. Levin ed., 1984).
82. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC
(1988).
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patrons before the first case was diagnosed.83 Gay bathhouses are still open in many
cities and remain a major vector for HIV infection. 84
Efforts to close gay bathhouses, while epidemiologically sound, have been
very controversial due to resistance from gay activists and some public health
officials who do not believe in mandatory public health actions. 85 Bathhouse
owners attempted to present expert testimony to contest the rationale for closing the
bathhouses. 86 Citing Williams, the court in New St. Mark's Baths held that as long
as the state's actions had a rational relationship to the state's objectives, the
regulated parties could not use the courts to attack the agency's policy decisions
unless the agency had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.87 This case
illustrates the tension between preventing the spread of HIV, which hits minority
communities particularly hard, and the privacy rights of infected persons.
88
Similarly, New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod provides an
example of how courts can use the rational relationship test to uphold clearly
incorrect public health policies.89 A major medical professional organization in
New York sued the state Commissioner of Health to force him to add HIV to the
state's list of "communicable and sexually transmissible diseases," which made
such listed diseases reportable in New York State.90 The Commissioner refused,
despite clear evidence that HIV was a communicable disease. 91 The court upheld
the state's refusal, finding that the Commissioner made a policy decision about the
best way to handle HIV infection and that plaintiffs could not contest this policy,
even if the factual basis for the Commissioner's decision was weak.92
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. applies Chevron to the FDA's
proposed regulations on the tobacco industry. 93 The case also supports teaching
83. Id.
84. Sue Fox, New Rules for Bathhouses OKd: L.A. County Supervisors Tentatively Approve an
Ordinance to Require Health Permits, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at B I; Andrew Jacobs, The Beast in
the Bathhouse: Crystal Meth Use by Gay Men Threatens to Reignite an Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2004, at B 1; Regina McEnery, Bathhouse Spurs HIV Concerns: Cleveland Health Officials Push for
Prevention Measures at New Club, PLAIN DEALER, July 16, 2006, at Al.
85. For an excellent discussion of the politics of closing bathhouses, see JOSEPH, supra note 3, at
100-09.
86. City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979, 983 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
87. Id.
88. This "AIDS exceptionalism," which did not treat HIV in the same manner as other
communicable diseases, has begun to come to an end, with new CDC recommendations and funding
guidelines requiring named reporting, contact investigation, andreductions in the barriers to testing such
as elaborate counseling requirements. See Thomas R. Frieden et al., Applying Public Health Principles
to the HIV Epidemic, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2397 (2005).
89. New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 609 (N.Y. 1991).
90. Id. at 606.
91. Id. at 606-07.
92. Id. at 609 (explaining that the court's review was "limited to whether [the Commissioner's]
determination is rationally based, i.e., whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious").
93. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2000).
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public health because it has an extensive history of tobacco and tobacco regulation
in the United States.94 The Supreme Court raised the interesting issue of the role of
regulatory precedent in statutory interpretation. Until these regulations, the FDA
maintained that it had no authority over tobacco, and that Congress had specifically
given other agencies this authority. Yet the clear language of the Food and Drug
Act seemed to cover nicotine in tobacco. The Court ultimately found that the FDA
did not have authority over tobacco,95 but in doing so, Justice Scalia and Justice
Breyer exchanged their traditional roles. Justice Scalia, by signing the majority
opinion, agreed with the argument that tobacco regulations must be viewed in light
of a long history of congressional intent to exempt tobacco from FDA regulation.
Justice Breyer, in dissent, argued that the history of tobacco regulation should be
ignored and that the Court should only look at the plain language of the statute.
96
IV. DUE PROCESS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
Due process is a fundamental issue in public health and in administrative law
in general. Students must learn to understand the differing standards for criminal
law due process, administrative due process for restrictions of persons, and due
process for economic rights and government benefits. Due process for economic
rights is the most common issue in public health and in administrative law in
general.
The Slaughter-House Cases examined opposition to a New Orleans statute
that regulated the slaughterhouse industry.97 They are important historical records
of a common public health problem during the period, as well as important
constitutional law cases. The slaughterhouse district in New Orleans was located in
swampland east of the French Quarter and was subject to flooding and poor
drainage, which created significant health risks from poorly managed offal and
blood.98 The City required the consolidation of existing slaughterhouses and
regulated the industry, including charges.99 The plaintiffs attacked these laws under
the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that the Fourteenth
Amendment granted them broad rights to due process and protection of their
property rights. 100 The Court rejected this challenge, reading the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly in order to preserve the state's police powers. 1 1 This
decision provides a useful forum for discussing the tension between individual
rights and the public's health. However, civil rights scholars have criticized the
94. Id. at 143-59.
95. Id. at 161.
96. Id. at 163 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
98. Id. at 64; Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American
Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1297-1301 (1984).
99. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59-60.
100. Id. at66.
101. Id. at 79-82.
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Slaughter-House Cases because of the Court's narrow reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 0 2 Students should think about what an expansive reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment in these cases would have done to states' authority to carry
out the sanitary revolution, which dramatically raised life expectancy between 1850
and today.
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. is the classic case upholding
zoning laws as a public health measure against challenges that they were an
unconstitutional taking) 0 3 One of the most important strategies in the sanitation
movement was the implementation of urban zoning laws to improve the quality of
life in residential housing. This case provides good discussions about housing and
environmental issues in public health. The original New York City zoning laws
were also an illustrative model for such laws throughout the United States.
10 4
Goldberg v. Kelly was a major break with the Court's precedent of limited
due process rights for administrative termination of government benefits and thus is
one of the new property cases.'0 5 While a Burger Court decision, Goldberg was
authored by Justice Brennan and more resembles a Warren Court opinion. The
plaintiffs in Goldberg were welfare recipients who were contesting the process
New York used to terminate their benefits. 10 6 Specifically, plaintiffs wanted a pre-
termination hearing, the right to give oral rather than written evidence, and other
due process considerations. 10 7 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held that
the termination of welfare benefits was such an important event for indigent
persons that it required the state to give them a chance to be heard before
termination. 0 8 The Court also granted plaintiffs' request that they be allowed to
testify orally, rather than providing written comments, reasoning that persons on
welfare might not be able to effectively prepare written testimony and were
unlikely to be represented by counsel. 0 9 The Court did not grant plaintiffs' request
for appointed counsel, however."0 It is important for students to understand the
102. James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities,
and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 68-69 (2002); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase
Court and Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in American Constitutionalism, 21 N. KY. L. REv. 151,
174-91 (1993); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 937-38 (1986).
103. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-96 (1926).
104. City of New York, Building Zone Resolution (July 25, 1916), available at
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cphl/history/laws/ny-index.htm.
105. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
106. Id. at 255-56.
107. Id. at 259-60.
108. Id. at 261.
109. Id. at 269.
110. Id. at 270. While some commentators have argued that the state must provide appointed counsel
for administrative proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has only required appointed counsel in
very limited circumstances outside of criminal proceedings. Compare Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (holding appointed counsel unnecessary in a parental status termination
proceeding), with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967) (finding appointed counsel necessary in juvenile
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rationale in the Goldberg case, as well as the burden the expansion of these due
process rights had on the agency. This burden lead the Supreme Court to limit
Goldberg to its facts only six years later.
The Supreme Court revisited the Goldberg rights in Mathews v. Eldridge."'
At issue in Mathews was whether Goldberg created a general right to pre-
termination hearings for federal benefits1 12 that would be applied to the termination
of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits.11 3 The Court held that the agency
could balance the value of the benefits against the cost of the due process and the
likelihood that the requested process will improve the accuracy of the decision-
making and expressed these as what has been called the Mathews factors:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and
(3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
114
The Court found that a pre-termination hearing would not significantly
improve the accuracy of the decision-making and thus was not required. 1 5 While
not directly overruling Goldberg, the 'Court has not applied the Goldberg rights in
any subsequent cases. The Mathews factors are at issue in all public health due
process cases and represent a special case of cost-benefit analysis. Accordingly,
students should explore how these factors would be applied in the public health
context.
Heckler v. Campbell also examines the awarding of Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits. 16 The government promulgated regulations defining the nature
of work that could be done by persons with various disabilities." 7 The intent of the
regulations was to simplify the review and hearing process by limiting the issues
that the fact-finder would have to determine on an individualized basis."' The
Court found that it was constitutionally permissible to use regulations to create
administrative presumptions which then could not be appealed in individual
cases. 119 This is an important principle in public health law because it means that
delinquency determination hearings because of the "awesome prospect of incarceration in a state
institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 2 1").
111. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
112. Id. at 325-26.
113. Id. at 323-24.
114. Id. at 335. The Mathews rationale is core to the Court's administrative due process
jurisprudence. E.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 211 (2005) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
115. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
116. 461 U.S. 458, 458 (1983).
117. Id. at 459-60.
118. Id. at 461-62.
119. See id. at 467.
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regulated parties cannot appeal or litigate matters established by administrative
regulations. Thus, a restaurant owner cannot contest the proper temperature to keep
hot soup if that temperature has been established by a regulation. Heckler, taken
with Mathews and Chevron, provides the framework for using administrative
regulations in public health.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
Administrative searches are one of the most difficult concepts in
administrative law, and public health law poses some of the most challenging
factual situations. All law students, as well as all viewers of television police
dramas and readers of crime literature, are indoctrinated with the probable cause
mantra, which provides that law enforcement officials cannot search without a
warrant, which must be based on probable cause and must describe, with
specificity, the objective of the search. Administrative searches get little attention
in administrative law courses and are often ignored in public health law courses,
but they are the main strategy for routine public health enforcement. Whether
inspecting restaurants, chasing rats in housing blocks, testing persons for
tuberculosis, or enforcing Good Manufacturing Practices in high-tech drug
companies, when a public health agency collects data, it is usually engaged in some
sort of administrative search. Students should understand the process and limits of
administrative searches. Administrative search jurisprudence is important in many
other areas of administrative practice, including national security law, where it has
been used to try to justify measures such as the warrantless interception of domestic
phone calls. It is likely that courts will revisit administrative searches as the war on
terrorism pushes the boundary between administrative and criminal searches.
Frank v. Maryland is the starting point for understanding administrative
searches and represents the law on administrative searches from the ratification of
the Constitution until Frank was modified in 1967.120 Frank is an archetypical
public health case. The Baltimore Health Department's rat inspector, acting on a
complaint, found evidence of severe rodent infestation at the defendant's home.
121
The inspector entered the defendant's yard looking for evidence of rats and asked
the defendant to allow him to inspect the basement.1 22 The defendant refused, and
the inspector, still without a warrant, returned with the police and had the defendant
arrested for refusing entry to a health inspector. 123 Justice Frankfurter delivered the
majority opinion-a classic Frankfurter opinion-and reviewed the history of
criminal law and administrative law searches from the English kings to the current
120. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). For a discussion of the Court's later refinement of the Frank holding, see
infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
121. Frank, 359 U.S. at 361.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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case. 124 Frank is a decision that is surprising to most law students and many
lawyers, because the Court upheld the warrantless search and the conviction of the
defendant, for refusing to have his house searched for rats.' 25 Frank provides a
valuable history of searches, but the core of the majority opinion is the distinction it
draws between the limited purpose for administrative searches: the prevention of
harm through administrative orders and penalties, and the sole purpose of a
criminal search: gathering evidence for a criminal prosecution. The distinction the
Court made between criminal and civil purposes and between punishment and
prevention had a profound effect on later Supreme Court decisions in cases
involving quasi-criminal proceedings, as discussed earlier in this article.
Furthermore, Justice Douglas wrote a stirring dissent in which he questioned both
the majority's interpretation of history as well as its policy.'
26
After Frank was decided in 1959, the Court began to rethink criminal rights
and privacy in general in the area warrant cases. 27 The Court limited Frank's
principle of warrantless entry for administrative searches in a pair of 1967
decisions: See v. Seattle, which concerned commercial property, 128 and Camara v.
Municipal Court, which involved a personal residence. 129 In both cases, the Court
found that warrantless searches were an invitation to improper behavior and even
harassment. 30 In place of warrantless searches, the Court created the area warrant,
a warrant that is not based on specific probable cause but is based on a general
health inspection program applied to a defined set of houses.' 3' For example, a city
health department might request an area warrant to inspect all the homes in a given
neighborhood for rats as part of a rat inspection program that attempts to inspect all
homes at least every five years. The Court also recognized that under some
circumstances-the need to do surprise inspections in restaurants, for example-
warrantless searches might still be necessary. 132 The Court also recognized that for
licensed or permitted businesses, the state may require warrantless entry during
124. Id. at 363-66.
125. Id. at 373.
126. Id. at 376-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
127. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (recognizing the Fifth Amendment
protection from self-incrimination creates privacy rights that extend to suspects in custody and that these
suspects must be clearly informed of their right to invoke this Constitutional protection by remaining
silent); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a zone of privacy created by the
Constitution that protects married couples in their decisions regarding contraception); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (recognizing that Fourth Amendment privacy rights render evidence obtained
through searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution inadmissible).
128. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
129. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
130. E.g., id. at 530-31 ("For instance, even the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest
in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority,
for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official sanction is a serious threat to personal and
family security.").
131. Id. at 536-39; See, 387 U.S. at 545.
132. See, 387 U.S. at 545 n.6.
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regular business hours as a condition of licensure or permitting.' 33 This exception
that allowed the state to make warrantless inspections a condition for licensed and
permitted businesses lead to the closely regulated industry cases.
The closely regulated industry cases are classic administrative search cases
which deal with health and safety violations that usually are not crimes on their
own. These cases involve businesses such as pharmacies, firearm dealers, or
automobile salvage yards, where the typical violations the inspectors are looking
for are crimes. In these cases, remedies were generally administrative orders to
remediate, or perhaps a civil fine. The cases reached courts in the form of
prosecutions for refusing to comply with the administrative orders. These cases
tested the Frank distinction between prevention and punishment.
In the first of these cases, New York v. Burger, the defendant operated an
automobile salvage yard. 134 New York law provided that salvage yards were
required to permit warrantless entry for inspections. 135 The police searched the
defendant's yard, and to do so they entered with the implied consent granted by the
owner as a condition of obtaining a permit to run the salvage yard. 136 The police
found parts from stolen automobiles and arrested the defendant-owner. 137 In
Burger, the Court identified three factors for deciding whether a warrantless
inspection is valid:
First, there must be a "substantial" government interest that informs the
regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made ....
Second, the warrantless inspections must be "necessary to further [the]
regulatory scheme." . . . Finally, "the statute's inspection program, in
terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." In other words, the
regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it
must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is
being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it
must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.1
38
Based on these factors, the Court found that having criminal penalties in
addition to administrative sanctions for violations of business regulations did not
transform an administrative search into a criminal search. 3 9 The Court was silent,
133. E.g., id. at 546 ("[N]or do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing
programs which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product.").
134. 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987).
135. Id. at 693-94.
136. Id. at 693-95.
137. Id. at 695-96.
138. Id. at 702-03 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 716-17.
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however, on whether the police could have arrested the defendant if they had found
a criminal violation unrelated to his licensed junkyard business. 40
Burger should be read with People v. Keta, a case joined with People v. Scott,
in which the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Burger facts under the New
York State Constitution.14 1 The court found that the state constitution provided
broader protections against warrantless searches which might result in criminal
prosecution. 142 The court held that searches which might result in criminal
prosecution, as that which occurred in Burger, must be based on a warrant that
meets criminal probable cause standards. 43 Scott therefore provides a useful
contrast between state and federal analysis.
There are three key discussion points for administrative warrants. First, a
warrant is only necessary if the owner refuses entry. Most public health searches
are done with the owner's permission and thus do not require a warrant. 44 Since
the legislature can require more protections by statute than is required by the
constitution, these standards could be changed if there was popular objection to
area warrants or warrantless searches as a condition of licensure and permitting.
What is unknown is whether courts would rethink area warrant requirements if
people refused searches often enough that the warrant process interfered with the
health department's ability to do its job. This would not be an issue in criminal
cases, but it would be a logical application of Mathews for the Court to rethink area
warrants if their use substantially interfered with public health and safety
inspections.
Second, there are a series of important but unresolved questions concerning
how courts would rule if evidence of unrelated criminal activity is found during the
search. For example, what if the rat inspector finds a stash of illegal machine guns
or illicit drugs? Does Frankfurter's limited purpose mean that this evidence cannot
be given to the police and used in a criminal prosecution? Or, as many law
enforcement agencies believe, is this a case of plain view, as long as the inspector
was legally on the premises? If the FBI or police departments train public health
inspectors to look for evidence of crimes, would this render the public health
inspectors agents of the police and thus defeat the plain view argument? It is
interesting that there are no United States Supreme Court opinions addressing the
140. The Court explains that an administrative search is "not rendered illegal" by the fact that a law
enforcement officer with the authority to arrest for other crimes or violations conducts the administrative
search, but does not address the implications, if any, for an unrelated arrest made pursuant to this
broader authority during the course of executing the inspection pursuant to the administrative warrant.
Id. at 717. This has been addressed in at least one state case, which rejected a prosecution based on
illegal weapons found during a restaurant inspection. City of Chicago v. Pudlo, 462 N.E.2d 494, 499-
501 (11. App. Ct. 1983).
141. People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1339 (N.Y. 1992).
142. Id. at 1341-43.
143. Id. at 1343.
144. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
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problem of evidence of criminal activity that is unrelated to the purpose of the
administrative search being found during an administrative search.
Third, in a subsequent case, the Supreme Court justified the search and arrest
of a gun dealer on the implied consent theory. 4 5 How far can the government go in
requiring individuals to give up their rights to refuse warrantless inspections as a
condition of government licenses and permits? Could it be part of the building
permit for homes, thus assuring free access forever?
VI. MANDATORY VACCINATIONS, TESTING, AND REPORTING
While Jacobson v. Massachusetts deals with mandatory vaccinations, 146 it is a
critical precedent for the testing and reporting cases. Testing and reporting are the
foundations of disease epidemiology, which is a fundamental component of
science-based public health. The right to do such testing and reporting is a special
case of administrative searches, but it became very controversial in the 1980s as
states debated requiring mandatory reporting of positive HIV test results.
47
Reporting and testing provides a vehicle for discussing the tension between
individual privacy and the public's health.
Jacobson contains classic language about the shared rights and
responsibilities of members of society 48 and provides a good opportunity for
students to discuss modem fears of vaccination and how states have responded to
them. Jacobson was decided the same term as Lochner v. New York. 149 Reading
these cases in parallel provides a very different view compared to the traditional
reading of Lochner as opposing all state health and safety regulations. It is
interesting that, until recently, most constitutional law books ignored Jacobson.
The Court has reaffirmed Jacobson in much more controversial areas; Jacobson is
a key precedent in the majority opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks, a decision which
upheld the preventive detention of sexual predators. 50 There are also a number of
145. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972).
146. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
147. Edward P. Richards, Communicable Disease Control in Colorado: A Rational Approach to
AIDS, 65 DENY. U. L. REv. 127, 130-31 (1988) (discussing the tension between advocates for
mandatory HIV reporting by public health departments and the American Civil Liberties Union's stance
that such reporting infringes on patient privacy and autonomy).
148.
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its
jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every
person is necessarily subject for the common good.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
149. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
150. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
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quasi-criminal law cases where the Court upholds significant deprivations of liberty
to protect the public's health.' 5'
State v. Armstrong is a classic tuberculosis control case152 that offers an
opportunity to examine tuberculosis, which, along with malaria and HIV, is one of
the great international health issues. Few students know that tuberculosis was once
the leading cause of death in the United States and was much more widespread than
HIV is today in the United States. 5 3 Worldwide, tuberculosis is still a leading
killer, second only to HIV/AIDS for infectious disease deaths (many of the
HIV/AIDS deaths are caused by secondary infection by tuberculosis), with malaria
close behind in that category.' 54 A good resource is a CDC publication, TB Notes,
2000, a special issue of the agency's TB Notes newsletter.
5 5
Armstrong is a mandatory tuberculosis testing case. Armstrong was a
Christian Scientist who wanted to register as a university student. 56 The State
University's Board of Regents required all students to have a chest x-ray for
tuberculosis, a common requirement at that time. 157 Armstrong resisted having the
x-ray, on the grounds that it was against her religion. 58 The court held that personal
religious beliefs must be subordinated to the protection of the public health. 5 9 In
the context of a discussion of quarantine and restrictions of individuals, Armstrong
151. These cases are reviewed in Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right
of Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST L.Q. 329, 352-84 (1989)
(discussing, inter alia, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (indefinite civil confinement for a
violent mentally ill convict to protect the general welfare); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, reh 'g
denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983) (reduction of the state's burden of proof to uphold a death sentence where a
"probability" existed that Barefoot posed a future risk); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (indefinite
regulatory detention of a sexual predator with the propensity to commit sexual assault again to undertake
fact finding)).
152. 239 P.2d 545 (Wash. 1952).
153. Div. OF TUBERCULOSIS ELIMINATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ABOUT TB 1 (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/faqs/pdfs/qa.pdf. Compare Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Cases of HIV/AIDS, by Area of
Residence, Diagnosed in 2004 - 33 States with Confidential Name-Based HIV Infection Reporting, in 16
HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REP. 6 (2004),
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2004report/pdf/2004SurveillanceReport.pd
f ("In 2004, the estimated rate of AIDS cases in the United States was 14.1 per 100,000 population."),
with CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TB
NOTES 2000, at 2 (2000), http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/notes/TBN__00/tbnl00.pdf [hereinafter CDC,
TB NOTES 2000] ("By 1904 the TB death rate for the United States was 188, by 1920 the rate was 100
per 100,000 .... ").
154. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2004: CHANGING HISTORY 120 tbl.2
(2004), http://www.who.int/entity/whr/2004/en/report04en.pdf; WORLD BANK, CONFRONTING AIDS:
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES FOR PREVENTION AND COPING 3 (1997),
http://www.worldbank.org/aidsecon/confront/present/lima/sldOO3.htm.
155. CDC, TB NOTES 2000, supra note 153. TB Notes, 2000 has several articles that can be assigned
for class.
156. Armstrong, 239 P.2d at 546.
157. Id.; CDC, TB NOTES 2000, supra note 153, at 5-6.
158. Armstrong, 239 P.2d at 546.
159. Id. at 549.
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is a case that illustrates the implications of a Christian Scientist refusing treatment
for tuberculosis, which can result in lifetime isolation.
In a similar vein, Reynolds v. McNichols reviewed a Denver regulation
requiring that prostitutes who were arrested be held until they were either tested for
gonorrhea or accepted epidemiological treatment, such as antibiotic treatment for
gonorrhea, based on their known high risk of infection. 160 In addition to privacy
claims, the petitioner made an equal protection claim based on the requirement that
prostitutes be detained, but not their clients. 161 A related and helpful companion
case is Cherry v. Koch, which includes a good history of prostitution laws. 162 The
Reynolds Court rejected these claims, finding that the City's "hold and treat" orders
were a valid exercise of the police power and that detaining only prostitutes, who
were at much higher risk of infection than their clients, was a rational response to
the problem of the gonorrhea epidemic.
163
While public health reporting laws go back to the colonial period, the
Supreme Court did not directly address mandatory public health reporting until
1977, with its decision in Whalen v. Roe.' 64 New York passed a law requiring all
prescriptions for narcotics and other Schedule II controlled substances to be
reported to the State. 16' The State would use this information to identify improper
prescribing practices and the diversion of controlled substances into illegal
channels.166 A group of physicians and patients sued to have the law declared an
unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy. 167 In an argument later repeated in
the battles over HIV reporting, the petitioners alleged that reporting would deter
people from seeking treatment and accepting necessary narcotic prescriptions.
168
The Supreme Court found that public health reporting laws were a valid exercise of
the State's police powers and were not an impermissible intrusion into personal
privacy. 169 The Court assumed in its opinion that the State would restrict access to
this information to legitimate public health purposes.
170
People v. Adams revisited the testing of prostitutes in the age of HIV/AIDS.
17 1
Illinois passed a law requiring persons convicted for a series of prostitution-related
160. 488 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1973).
161. Id. at 1383.
162. 491 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
163. Reynolds, 488 F.2d at 1383; see also Edward P. Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, The Role of
the Police Power in 21st Century Public Health, 26 J. SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES ASS'N 350,
353 (1999) (discussing the Denver program).
164. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
165. Id. at 593.
166. Id. at 591-93.
167. Id. at 595, 598.
168. Id. at 600.
169. Id. at 603-04.
170. Id. at 605-06.
171. 597 N.E.2d 574 (Ill. 1992).
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crimes to be tested for HIV. 172 The court presented a detailed review of the law on
involuntary testing in general and on the special issues involved in testing
prisoners.'7 3 The court held that the testing did not violate the prisoners'
constitutional rights. 
74
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court reviewed a program in which
pregnant women were tested for illegal drug use while obtaining prenatal care. 175
The women did not consent to this testing. 176 The testing was done to protect the
fetus; if a woman tested positive, she was threatened with criminal prosecution
unless she complied with a drug treatment program. 177 This is an important case,
touching both on the administrative search issues discussed previously in this
article and the right to mandate public health testing. The Court found that the
public health rationale in this case was a subterfuge because the test results were
used for criminal law purposes. 178 This violates a constitutional bright line that the
Court has established between public health authority and criminal law authority. 179
When discussing this case, students should consider whether it is a ban on all
unconsented testing of pregnant women for illegal drugs, or whether it only bans
unconsented testing that is used for law enforcement.
The Court, in Smith v. Doe, reviewed the newly fashionable laws that require
public notification about the identity and whereabouts of persons convicted of
sexual offenses.' 80 The Alaska law at issue in this case requires detailed
information, including pictures, about persons convicted of sex crimes and child
kidnapping, to be made public; the state chose to do so by posting the information
on the Intemet. 18 Petitioners attacked the law as additional punishment imposed
after their conviction of a crime and asserted that the law violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 82 The Court rejected this challenge, holding that the purpose of this law
was prevention, not punishment. 183 According to the Court, since the law did not
punish the offenders, it did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 84 Students
reading Smith should be directed to the Court's circular rationale for finding that
this was not a punitive law.'
8 5
172. Id. at 576.
173. Id. at 580-83.
174. Id. at 586.
175. 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 72.
178. Id. at 82-83.
179. Id. at 79-80 n.15.
180. 538 U.S. 84, 89 (2003).
181. Id. at 91; ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (2004).
182. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
183. Smith, 538 U.S. at 96.
184. Id. at 103-04. It is revealing that the petitioners, as sex offenders, did not bother to bring
privacy claims.
185.
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The reasoning in Smith echoes Frank v. Maryland and extends a long line of
cases that redefine seemingly criminal proceedings as quasi-public health actions,
and which thus do not trigger criminal due process protections. Rejecting the high
point of criminal due process protections reached by the Warren Court in the case
of In re Gault,'8 6 these cases allow criminals to be held without bail to prevent
them from committing crimes; 87 allow pretrial detainees, including material
witnesses in protective custody, to be incarcerated and treated as prisoners; 188 and
generally allow the state broad latitude to use criminal law tools without criminal
law due process protections if done with a public health rationale. 189 Students
should discuss the applicability of this theory of prevention versus punishment in
the context of the detention of terrorist subjects; these ideas can be revisited after
further discussions on restrictions and habeas corpus.
VII. RESTRICTIONS OF INDIVIDUALS AND HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
Public health law is the one area of administrative law that deals with the
physical restriction of individuals and habeas corpus review. Most law students
never learn about habeas corpus jurisprudence, and many practicing lawyers, even
public health lawyers, do not understand its reach or significance. This may explain
why some scholars argue that quarantine and isolation laws are unconstitutional
unless they provide specific constitutional due process provisions. 90 Habeas corpus
is one of the most fundamental promises in the Constitution, and it applies to the
states.' 9' Habeas corpus always provides due process for persons detained by states
for public health purposes, without regard to whether states have specific statutes
providing habeas corpus review. The basic habeas corpus procedure is that the
detained individual has a right to a hearing before a judge, forcing the state to show
the legal authority for the individual's detention and the state's prima facie case for
the detention. 92 Since habeas corpus is critical to understanding due process in
public health detentions, it is useful to start with Ex Parte Milligan, President
The Act itself does not require the procedures adopted to contain any safeguards associated
with the criminal process. That leads us to infer that the legislature envisioned the Act's
implementation to be civil and administrative. By contemplating "distinctly civil
procedures," the legislature "indicate[d] clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal
sanction."
Id. at 96 (citation omitted).
186. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
187. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
188. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1979).
189. Id. at 539. For a detailed discussion of this case and Salerno, see Richards, supra note 151, at
356-59, 378-84.
190. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., IMPROVING STATE LAW TO PREVENT AND TREAT INFECTIOUS
DISEASE (1998), available at http://www.milbank.org/010130improvinglaw.html.
191. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
192. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004).
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Lincoln's attempt to suspend habeas corpus.' 93 This case is a good review of the
constitutional basis for habeas corpus.
Beyond Ex Parte Milligan, however, is Korematsu v. United States, the
Japanese internment case.' 94 It is a useful case to read in a public health law class
because it was based on a traditional combined national security/public health and
safety rationale. 195 Japanese Americans were quarantined to prevent their harming
society, as if they were potential carriers of a communicable disease.' 96 The
Supreme Court upheld the detention in language that is reminiscent of
contemporary debates about the detention of terrorists.197 A companion case,
Hirabayashi v. United States, upheld a criminal conviction for not complying with
a detention order.' 98 The factual basis for Hirabayashi and Korematsu was
reconsidered in a 1984 case in which a district court vacated Korematsu's
conviction pursuant to a writ of coram nobis.199 The Supreme Court has never
rejected the legal basis for Korematsu, however, and it therefore continues to
provide a good starting point for a discussion of whether, faced with an equivalent
threat today, the Court would act differently than it did in 1944.
20Hamdi v. Rumsfeld updates Ex Parte Milligan to modem times. 00 Congress
and the President attempted to limit the judicial review of the detention of citizens
held in the United States on terrorism charges. 20 1 The Court found that the
defendant did have a right to have his detention reviewed by the courts, but did not
categorically deny the President the right to carry out these detentions. 0 2 Justice
Scalia added a powerful dissent, arguing against the principle of open-ended
detentions and reviewing the history of detention back to Blackstone:
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal
liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest,
magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought
proper... there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities
.... To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate,
without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the
whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying
him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less
193. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
194. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944).
195. Id. at 223.
196. Id. at 223-24.
197. Id.
198. 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943).
199. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419-20 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
200. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530-31 (2004).
201. Id. at 510-11.
202. Id. at 518, 533-37.
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public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of
arbitrary government. 203
Hamdi raises the issues of long-term preventive detentions in lieu of criminal
prosecutions. When reading Hamdi, students should consider whether the issues are
the same for long-term detentions for posing a risk to the public health such as the
indefinite detention of a person with drug-resistant tuberculosis who remains
infectious despite consenting to treatment.
In Varholy v. Sweat, the petitioner was detained on suspicion of carrying a
venereal disease 20 4 (a sexually transmitted infection or STI). She brought a habeas
corpus proceeding to demand her release and also made a claim for bail. 0 5 The
court discussed the habeas corpus process in public health cases and the rationale
for denying bail in public health cases. 20 6 Varholy is a good vehicle for introducing
students to STI control laws and their importance to the military, especially before
penicillin became available to treat STIs after World War 11.207
In a similar vein, In re Halko is a classic tuberculosis isolation case.20 8 The
petitioner was confined in a state hospital because he was infected with contagious
tuberculosis. 20 9 He requested habeas corpus review of this confinement.210 The
court explained the basis for holding persons infected with tuberculosis and the
need to periodically review their detentions. 2 11 Notably, courts did not have
hearings before traditional public health detentions;212 orders to confine individuals
were issued ex parte. The first opportunity for a confined individual to be heard
was usually the habeas corpus hearing.213
City of Newark v. J.S. stands alone in equating public health detentions with
mental health detentions, and imposing mental health detention standards on the
detention of an infectious tuberculosis carrier.214 This case has not been followed in
203. Id. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 131 (1765)).
204. 15 So. 2d 267, 268 (Fla. 1943).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 269-70.
207. Peter Neushul, Science, Government, and the Mass Production of Penicillin, 48 J. HIST. MED.
ALLIED Sci. 371, 395 (1993).
208. 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
209. Id. at 661.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 664.
212. Ex Parte Roman, 199 P. 580 (Okla. Crim. App. 1921); Richards, supra note 151, at 342.
213. The provision of pre-detention hearings for simple public heath orders is a relatively new
practice. Older cases (see Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943); Crayton v. Larabee 116 N.E. 355
(N.Y. 1917)) are habeas corpus proceedings precisely because there was no pre-detention hearing; had
there been, it would have obviated the need for a habeas corpus hearing.
214. 652 A.2d 265, 275-77 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
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any other jurisdictions. It should be contrasted with states that provide extra due
215process protections by statute.
States are generally free to provide greater protections than are required by
the United States or states' individual constitutions. Students should consider
whether the analysis in City of Newark is correct, as well as the impact of the
administrative costs it imposes on public health agencies. In particular, the
requirement of a hearing with appointed counsel is very difficult for smaller health
departments and those without the funds to pay for appointed counsel. This can
make the department reticent to detain individuals, even when they pose a
significant threat to others, as happened in Texas in the 1980s.216 Students should
also consider what due process rights would be appropriate for the isolation of
tuberculosis carriers using a Mathews analysis..
CONCLUSION
Public health law is properly seen, and taught, as administrative law. These
lessons are only an example of how administrative law principles can be taught
through public health law. This is consistent with the historical development of
public health law 217 and its contemporary practice. Teaching public health law as
administrative law is critical if students are to understand the functioning of public
health agencies within the larger governmental structure. Public health law
provides challenging examples that are more understandable to students than are
arcane federal regulatory examples.
215. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).
216. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Outbreak of Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis - Texas,
California. and Pennsylvania, 39 MORBIDITY '& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 369, 369-72 (1990)
(documenting the spread of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis to several persons in different places in
Texas by a tuberculosis carrier that the state's public health authorities were unable to isolate).
217. See JAMES A. TOBEY, PUBLIc HEALTH LAW 217-34 (3d ed. 1947).
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